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THE THIRD PLAGUE PANDEMIC AND BRITISH INDIA: A 
TRANSFORMATION OF SCIENCE, POLICY, AND INDIAN 
SOCIETY 
 
By Rebecca L. Burrows 
 
Cholera, malaria, influenza, and now COVID-19 all have cast 
fear and panic into the hearts of mankind. These unexplained, hidden 
killers spared few, regardless of age, gender or ethnicity. Disease has 
haunted mankind throughout history. After the Black Death’s decimation 
of 13th century Eurasia, the bubonic plague took residence in the hearts 
of mankind as a frightening reminder of human mortality. While other 
pestilences tormented the world, plague lurked in the background, 
reappearing in smaller epidemics to remind the world that it had not truly 
disappeared. Scientific advancements of the 19th century set about 
conquering diseases that afflicted mankind as new technology and 
understanding allowed for vaccines and cures. However, an outbreak of 
plague in China in 1850 tested both the great powers of imperialism and 
the greatest scientists of the time as the outbreak rapidly spread to 
become the Third Plague Pandemic. The Third, and most recent, Plague 
Pandemic, while spreading throughout the world, struck hardest in 
colonial India where it brought tremendous loss, but also advancements 
in scientific understanding, unheard of proactive prevention measures, 
and increased separation between the colonial powers of Great Britain 
and the common people of India.   
Plague remained quite a mystery up to the late 19th- early 20th 
century. The First Plague Pandemic, also called the Plague of Justinian, 
occurred in ancient times, and the Second Plague Pandemic, also called 
the Black Plague or the Black Death, lasted several hundred years across 
Europe, Asia and the Mediterranean. By the Third Pandemic, medical 
professionals and scientists still speculated much about the cause, spread, 




and prevention of plague. These speculations informed policy and 
prevention measures, especially in India, and many of the popular plague 
theories evolved as both public opinion and scientific understanding 
changed.  
Currently, it is known that plague is derived from the bacterium 
Bacillus pestis. Originally identified as Bacterium pestis, the name was 
changed to Bacillus pestis in 1900. In 1970 the name was once again 
changed to its final form of Yersinia pestis to honor the bacteria’s 
discoverer, Alexandre Yersin.1 Bacillus pestis consisted of three 
plasmids, a type of DNA molecule that can replicate independently such 
as pFra, pCD, and Pla, which allow for the bacteria’s survival, spread, 
and role in phagocytosis disruption.2  The pathogen’s outer proteins 
worked to obstruct and damage the cell once in contact with host cells, 
therefore compromising the immunity of the host.3 While the most 
commonly thought of strand of plague remains the bubonic type, plague 
consists of several different variations.4 One such variation is the 
pneumonic form, the only person-to-person infectious strand of plague. 
Another variant called the septicemic strand uses blood to transport the 
bacterium. Both of these strands result in a higher mortality rate then the 
commonly experienced bubonic plague but appear in far fewer cases 
globally.  
 The plague bacteria is now known to be spread through rats or 
rodent species, and a carrier. Notably, in most cases of successful 
infection the rat flea (Pulex cheopis or X. cheopis) acts as the carrier. As 
L. Fabian Hirst, author of The Conquest of Plague, wrote, “no rats, no 
                                                 
1 T. Butler, “Plague History: Yersin’s Discovery of the Causative 
Bacterium in 1894 Enabled, in the Subsequent Century, Scientific Progress in 
Understanding the Disease and the Development of Treatments and Vaccines,” 
Clinical Microbiology and Infection 20 no. 3 (January 2014): 203. 
2 Butler, “Plague History,” 207. 
3 Ruifu Yang, “Plague: Recognition, Treatment, and Prevention,” 
Journal of Clinical Microbiology 56, no. 1 (December 2017): e01519  
4 Butler, “Plague History,” 203. 
 




plague.”5 Rattus rattus, or the common black rat, has been found to be 
the predominant cause of plague among humans as it nests closer to 
people than other rat types. Its fleas, X. cheopis, are also more likely to 
attack humans when hungry and lacking a proper host.6 In fact, the most 
common rat type in Bombay until the mid-1900s was R. rattus.7 Coupled 
with the high numbers of Rattus norvegicus, a sister rat species, the 
plague survived and continued even during the off-season.8 The pattern 
of “(1) plague among rats with many deaths, (2) a lull, (3) then plague 
among men,” that W.B. Bannerman wrote of in 1906 showcased the role 
of the flea in plague transmission. As the flea became increasingly 
hungry when its natural hosts died, it would eventually attack man, 
spreading plague as it bit.9  
After the infection made its way into the human body, patients 
initially presented with flu-like symptoms: fever, chills, and a 
headache.10 This was easy to mistake for another of India’s prevalent 
diseases if the physician or medical practitioner was not looking for 
plague symptoms. Usually, around the flea-bitten area, an inflamed, dry 
region would develop stimulating severe pain.11 Rapidly increasing 
fever, fatigue, extreme pain, and swollen lymph nodes, or buboes, 
occurred over the next few days as the bubonic plague infection 
progressed throughout the body. During this excruciating process, the 
                                                 
5 L. Fabian Hirst, The Conquest of Plague: A Study of the Evolution of 
Epidemiology (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1953), 121. 
6 Hirst, The Conquest of Plague, 124. 
7 Places throughout the essay will be referred to in their British Indian 
form to maintain consistency with the sources of the time. S.C. Seal, 
“Epidemiological Studies of Plague in India: 2. The Changing Patterns of 
Rodents and Fleas in Calcutta and Other Cities,” Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization 23, no. 2-3 (1960): 293. 
8 Hirst, The Conquest of Plague, 139. 
9 W. B. Bannerman, "The Spread of Plague in India." The Journal of 
Hygiene 6, no. 2 (April, 1906): 208. 
10 Yang, “Plague: Recognition, Treatment, and Prevention,” 2-3. 
11 Yang, “Plague: Recognition, Treatment, and Prevention,” 3. 
 




patient’s immune system rapidly deteriorated and their buboes increased 
in size. Typically by a week after infection, the patient recovered slowly 
from the excruciating ordeal or passed away due to major organ failure.12 
Although most medical professionals and scientists neither knew 
nor suspected fleas or rats originally, by 1897 theories and experiments 
shifted the scientific mindset. As early as 1896, scientists identified that 
rats played a role in plague. By January 1897, scientists identified that 
plague first affected rats, serving as a warning sign for an approaching 
human epidemic.13 The scientific contributions made by gifted 
individuals worked to change the entire perception of plague and anti-
plague measures. However, these changes came late, after considerable 
damage was already done to British-Indian relations and to the native 
people enduring the aggressive British anti-plague campaign.  
Plague was not new to India when the Third Plague Pandemic 
occurred. Instead, it had reared its head throughout the land several times 
over the 1800s and centuries before. K. Marion Hunter, a British plague 
officer writing for the Nineteenth Century journal in 1898, addressed this 
when he remarked that “In India, plague has probably existed since 1815, 
from time to time in a sporadic form and under many names in various 
parts of the country, with no reliable information as to mode of origin.”14 
Cutch, a princely state in the north-west coastal region of India, suffered 
famine then plague in 1812.15 By 1815, nearby regions, such as Gujarat, 
experienced outbreaks. Some of these were perhaps attributed to an 
influx of Egyptian cotton while Egypt underwent an outbreak of plague, 
including the Pali plague of 1836-37 which displayed classical bubonic 
                                                 
12 Myron J. Echenberg, Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of 
Bubonic Plague, 1894-1901 (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 9. 
13 James Cantlie, "Abstract Of An Address On The Spread Of 
Plague," The British Medical Journal 1, no. 1880 (1897): 73. 
14 K. Marion Hunter, “Fighting the Bubonic Plague in India,” The 
Nineteenth Century 43, no. 256 (June 1, 1898): 1008. 
15 Ira Klein, "Plague, Policy and Popular Unrest in British 
India," Modern Asian Studies 22, no. 4 (1988): 735. 
 




plague markers.16 Despite the earlier presence of plague, Ira Klein, a 
historian who has written extensively on India, argued that the lack of 
countrywide devastation was due to the Himalayan villages’ sparseness, 
combined with the villagers’ tendency to run away from any impending 
disease.17  
Anil Kumar, in Medicine and the Raj, explained that while 
plague occurred in India before 1896, its mild quality was confirmed 
through the absence of a plague deity found in Indian Muslim or Hindu 
communities.18 The local death-tolls, despite never reaching the damage 
of the First and Second Pandemics, should have warranted some 
attention from the East India Company rulers in India. Yet, the 
intervention of the company, who ruled parts of India until 1858, was 
unremarkable compared to the measures taken by the British government 
in 1896. The lack of reaction partly stemmed from a bigger concern 
within the land: cholera. Throughout the early to mid-1800s, cholera 
epidemics exploded across the world, driving the locally bound plague to 
the corners of the mind. 
The Third Plague Pandemic began in China in the 1850s and 
quickly spread to Hong Kong, leading to a violent outbreak there in 
1894.19 France, Japan, and several other countries around the world sent 
scientists to study the epidemic in China in order to discern more about 
plague. One of these scientists, Alexandre Yersin from France, 
discovered the bacterial cause of plague in 1894 during extensive 
experiments in Hong Kong. 20 Yersin’s discovery of what was termed 
                                                 
16 I. J. Catanach, “The “Globalization” of Disease?: India and the 
Plague,” Journal of World History 12, no. 1 (2001): 10. 
17 Klein, “Plague, Policy, and Popular Unrest,” 736. 
18 Anil Kumar, Medicine and the Raj: British Medical Policy in India, 
1835-1911 (London: Sage Publications Inc., 1998), 193. 
19 Robert Nathan, The Plague in India, 1896, 1897, vol. 1 (Simla, 
India: Printed at the Government Central Printing Office, 1898), 110; Butler, 
“Plague History,” 207. 
20 Butler, “Plague History,” 202. 
 




Bacterium pestis prompted a rapid race to understand more about the 
bacteria, specifically concerning how it was transmitted to people. 
Among the scientific community at the time, a popular theory concerning 
the spread of the disease centered on the idea that the bacteria hid in the 
soil. Therefore, many scientists believed the theory explained that people 
who went barefoot, like many in Indian cities and towns, contracted the 
plague quicker. Another theory considered the contamination of the food 
supply as the reason behind the rapid spreading of plague across China 
and into other nations.21 These theories did not usually consider the role 
of rats except as beasts living closer to the soil, explaining their high 
death rate but neglecting their part in facilitating the spread of plague. 
Oftentimes, scientists studying the plague wondered if rats acted as a 
precursor to outbreaks of the disease, but they were unable to find 
concrete evidence indicating rats as the cause of the plague. Experiments 
and observations put these theories to the test as plague spread to its next, 
and most deadly, location: India. 
Plague arrived in India through sea transportation, presumably 
from Hong Kong. 22 During the initial outbreak in Hong Kong, India 
imposed a quarantine against sea trade from the city. However, India 
lifted the quarantine as the epidemic slowed down, allowing for the 
plague to spread and arrive at several key Indian ports.23 Calcutta, on the 
eastern coast of British India; Karachi, in modern day Pakistan; Poona, 
on the western coast of British India; and Bombay, to the west as well, 
all reported sightings of some plague-like fever in 1896. Although cases 
of glandular swellings, a classic plague sign, were found as early as May 
1896, no official diagnosis was made until late 1896. This was most 
likely due to the lack of knowledge on identifying the plague amongst 
                                                 
21 W.B. Bannerman, Plague in India, Past and Present: A Contrast 
(Bungay: Richard Clay and Sons, 1910), 6; Charles Creighton and the Royal 
College of Surgeons of England, Plague in India (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1907), 313. 
22 Klein, “Plague, Policy, and Popular Unrest,” 737. 
23 Nathan, The Plague in India, vol. 1, 110. 
 




the medical community. September 1896 saw an increased average 
mortality rate through the city in classifications of fevers and all other 
disease, for which plague was often mistaken.24 Newspapers and journals 
reported a large number of rat deaths within the city to the extent that 
“children used to amuse themselves by throwing dead rats into the 
gullies and frightening and chasing each other in the streets with the 
carcasses of the rats they found.”25 Speculation of the rats’ connection to 
plague continued, but it focused on the rats’ greater susceptibility to 
plague rather than the rat’s role in spreading plague. Within the year, 
Bombay’s epidemic exploded throughout the city whereas the other 
ports’ plague encounters practically disappeared.26 The official plague 
diagnosis came on September 23, 1896, when Dr. A.G. Viegas, an Indian 
physician of Bombay City, reported that he found “a genuine case” of 
bubonic plague, beginning a mass epidemic that would change the future 
of India. 27 
Reports of the plague’s presence in India spread like a wildfire. 
Within a day of Dr. Viegas’ report, newspapers across the United 
Kingdom announced that “a serious outbreak of bubonic plague has 
occurred” in Bombay and almost 300 people already had died.28 In 
Bombay, the Bombay Gazette argued that the disease identified as plague 
was not truly plague but a mild fever.29 Medical and governmental 
officials in Bombay predominantly met the presence of the plague with 
                                                 
24 Nathan, The Plague in India, vol. 1, 108-9. 
25 "The Plague in India," The British Medical Journal 2, no. 1869 
(1896): 1254. 
26 Muhammad Umair Mushtaq, “Public Health in British India: A Brief 
Account of the History of Medical Services and Disease Prevention in Colonial 
India,” Indian Journal of Community Medicine 34, no. 1 (January 2009): 9. 
27 Echenberg, Plague Ports, 47. 
28 “Bubonic Plague at Bombay,” St. James’s Gazette, September 24, 
1896, 9. 
29 Echenberg, Plague Ports, 47. 
 




great resistance.30 Partly, this resistance came from disagreements over 
Dr. Viegas’ ability to diagnosis plague since many of the British saw 
local Indian practitioners as barely proficient in medicine. Local Indian 
physicians were the vaidyas and the hakims who practiced within the 
individual religious communities and held the respect of the people. 
These practitioners either performed Ayurveda medicine, traditionally a 
Hindu practice from Sanskrit works, or Greco-Arabic medicine common 
in Muslim communities.31 Originally, British efforts attempted to 
westernize the native physicians while seeing some use for their system. 
With the wave of western rationalization and superiority dominating 
European perspectives, many British medical professionals started to see 
the Indian medical system as irrational and the native physicians as 
inexperienced and inferior to their British counterparts.32 Therefore, the 
British often discredited diagnoses by the native community of 
physicians, as was the case initially with the Third Plague Pandemic. 
Internationally, the British originally attempted to minimize the 
outbreak within India, instead referring to it as a case of “bubonic fever” 
to reassure the public and foreign trading partners.33 The ruse convinced 
few. France desired the closure of Bombay’s ports to help stop the spread 
of plague into Europe and imposed their own extreme restrictions on 
incoming Indian ships.34 Other nations implemented similar restrictions 
against Indian ships and goods as proactive measures. Russian ports 
treated Indian ships, goods, and people as if already contaminated, while 
several other cities, such as Baghdad, required Indians to undergo 
quarantine upon arrival. Italy went as far as to refuse Indian ships entry 
                                                 
30 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic 
Disease in Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), 203. 
31 Anu Saini, “Physicians of Colonial India (1757-1900),” Journal of 
Family Medicine and Primary Care 5 no.3 (Jul-Sep 2016): 5. 
32 Saini, “Physicians of Colonial India,” 16, 20. 
33 Echenberg, Plague Ports, 55. 
34 Echenberg, Plague Ports, 55-6. 
 




to their ports.35 Panic and fear spread in Europe over the thought of the 
dreaded black plague’s return. This fear heavily influenced the 
unprecedented, ruthless anti-plague measures of the British in India.36 
The first cases of plague came from the district of Mandvi, one 
of Bombay’s seven city wards. Known for being an extremely insanitary 
part of the city, medical officials concluded that the present conditions 
within the ward were already ripe for disease.37 Plague first struck 
workers in the grain warehouses, but soon spread to the merchants as 
well.38 While Mandvi held a large number of cases as the beginning 
point of plague infiltration, plague appeared all over the city quite 
rapidly. Consequently, this lent validity to the theory that cases had 
existed prior to Dr. Viegas’s announcement in September.39 
To confirm Dr. Viegas’s claim of plague in Bombay, the British 
Imperial government of India asked Dr. Waldemar Haffkine, a 
remarkable bacteriologist, to come to the city and provide verification on 
the possible outbreak of bubonic plague. Dr. Haffkine’s previous work 
with the creation of the cholera vaccine made him an ideal candidate to 
research the plague.40 Dr. Haffkine arrived on October 7, 1896, set up a 
laboratory, and began working.41 The British government in India also 
appointed a committee of five scientists, Haffkine included, to 
                                                 
35 Natasha Sarkar, "Plague in Bombay: Response of Britain’s Indian 
Subjects to Colonial Intervention,” Proceedings of the Indian History 
Congress 62 (2001): 445. 
36 Kumar, Medicine and the Raj, 194. 
37 Prashant Kidambi, "'An Infection of Locality': Plague, 
Pythogenesis and the Poor in Bombay, C. 1896-1905," Urban History 31, 
no. 2 (2004): 255. 
38 Echenberg, Plague Ports, 48. 
39 Nathan, The Plague in India, vol. 1, 110. 
40 “Dr. Haffkine Dies; Cholera Conquered,” New York Times, October 
28, 1930, 21. 
41 Selman Abraham Waksman, The Brilliant and Tragic Life of 
W.M.W. Haffkine, Bacteriologist (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1964), 30. ; Bannerman, Plague in India, Past and Present, 2. 
 




investigate the bubonic plague, specifically considering means of 
spreading, treatment options and prevention methods.42 British 
imperialists confidently believed that western medicine was superior to 
anything found in India and that the disease would quickly be taken care 
of. 
In preparation for Haffkine’s results and as an effort to stay 
ahead of the outbreak, the British government in India on October 6, 
1896, extended the already substantial authority of Bombay’s municipal 
commissioner, P.C.H. Snow at the time of the epidemic. The official 
announcement endowed the commissioner the ability to grant the right of 
entry to his officers’. In effect, this authorized their entry into any 
building suspected to house plague. It also allowed Snow to enforce the 
segregation and hospitalization of plague cases. 43 Less than a week later, 
by October 14, Dr. Haffkine confirmed that the outbreak in Bombay was 
indeed bubonic plague.44 He immediately began working on a vaccine 
geared at preventing infection rather than attempting to discover a cure.45 
Ironically, as Haffkine made his announcement, I.J. Catanach, author of 
a substantial number of works on India and the plague, wrote that “the 
Bombay Gazette was ‘glad to report that the sickness is rapidly being 
stamped out’.”46  
With the commissioner’s newfound powers and Haffkine’s 
positive results, the city of Bombay’s municipal officers went to work to 
stop the spread of the infection. By mid-October, commissioner Snow 
                                                 
42 Creighton, Plague in India, 309; “Bubonic Plague," The British 
Medical Journal 2, no. 1871 (1896): 1402. 
43 M.E. Couchman, Account of Plague Administration in the Bombay 
Presidency from September 1896 till May 1897 (Bombay: Government Central 
Press, 1897), 11. 
44 "Bubonic Plague in India," The British Medical Journal 2, no. 1868 
(1896): 1161. 
45 Waksman, The Brilliant and Tragic Life of W.M.W. Haffkine, 32. 
46 I.J. Catanach, Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. David 
Arnold (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 149. 
 




ordered the hospitalization of all plague cases within the city. Officers 
searched the city to find any suspected cases, but many remained 
untrained in distinguishing plague from other Indian fevers. In order to 
purify the city and stop the epidemic, a massive project of urban 
cleansing was undertaken.47 Thousands of gallons of sea water and 
carbolic acid washed out sewers and drains throughout the night. During 
the day, a great number of shops, houses, and warehouses were 
disinfected with limewashing and powder. Regretfully, the plague 
officers destroyed many slum housings in their effort to cleanse the 
city.48 Earthen floors were dug up and entire buildings torn down based 
on the belief that plague remained in the soil and spread through 
contact.49 The municipal health officers conducted their urban cleansing 
throughout Bombay, paying special attention to the most insanitary 
districts, often the poorest parts of the city, in compliance with 19th 
century sanitation theory.  
The measures undertaken by governmental officials relied on 
common 19th century perceptions and understandings of the cause and 
transmission of plague. Classical miasmic theory clashed and blended 
with new germ theory and bacterial science, leading to a disconnect 
between knowledge and action that played out throughout India. 
Epidemiologists from Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, and Britain 
arrived in India after 1896 to study the disease.50 Initial theories of what 
caused the dissemination of the plague bacteria split depending on which 
theory one ascribed to. Miasmatic theorists argued that “plague was not a 
filth fever but a ‘want-of-fresh-air disease’” whereas bacteriologists 
focused on filth and squalor as the precipitating causes of the plague.51 
                                                 
47 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 204. 
48 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 203-4; Nathan, The Plague in India, 
vol. 1, 135. 
49 Echenberg, Plague Ports, 57. 
50 Hirst, The Conquest of Plague, 105-6. 
51 Hirst, The Conquest of Plague, 120. 
 




Debates over the plague as a contagion, the bacteriologist view of a 
pathogen that is able to pass from person to person through contact, or a 
miasmatic disease persisted even in light of new pathological evidence. 
Suspicions over the part of rats in the plague arose in both scientific 
camps, but neither determined whether the rat or the human was first 
affected.52 As such, rats played a small role in both theories. Prashant 
Kidambi, author of “An Infection of Locality,” remarked that medical 
and sanitary personnel in Bombay held onto the localist miasmatic 
ideologies of plague even though most believed in germ theory. 53 This 
disparity affected policy and anti-plague measures within the city as two 
separate beliefs competed to impact decisions. 
Despite differences in fundamental scientific philosophies, both 
of these theories focused their recommended prevention efforts on the 
poorest districts of Bombay: the slums. Bombay was considered one of 
the most densely inhabited metropolises of the time with what Klein 
described as “appalling crowding and insanitation.”54 Later called “the 
city of the Plague,” Bombay housed a variety of diseases such as typhus, 
malaria, cholera, and several fevers that contributed to the unhealthiness 
of the city.55 Two to three families lived in one room in increasingly 
dark, water-logged and filth-ridden conditions. Miasmatic theory viewed 
these conditions as the perfect breeding ground for the plague. Not only 
were the living conditions considered subpar, there was a lack of fresh 
air which common perception thought to increase the power of the 
plague bacillus and its attack on humans.56  The root cause of plague, 
                                                 
52 "Bubonic Plague in India," The British Medical Journal 2, no. 1868 
(1896): 1161. 
53 Kidambi, "An Infection of Locality,” 254. 
54 Klein, "Plague, Policy and Popular Unrest," 740. 
55 Sidney Low, A Vision of India: As Seen During the Tour of the 
Prince and Princess of Wales (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1906), 10. 
56 Klein, "Plague, Policy and Popular Unrest," 740. 
 




many sanitation and medical officials believed, was the combination of 
pollution and poor sanitary conditions abundant in the city’s slums.57  
As the municipal government embarked on a fierce sanitation 
campaign, they met heavy resistance from the Indian people. Forced 
hospitalization and segregation of plague victims encountered strong 
opposition, especially concerning the examination and removal of 
women from the home.58 The Indian poor made up the largest percentage 
of hospitalization cases, something of which they were acutely aware.59 
The poor’s overrepresentation contributed to their increased protests of 
the commissioner’s actions. On October 29, 1896, health officers 
hospitalized a female millhand; violence erupted at Bombay’s Arthur 
Road Infectious Diseases Hospital as around a thousand millhands 
attacked and destroyed the hospital.60 Only the arrival of the police 
managed to drive off the enraged crowd. Almost immediately afterwards, 
Snow dictated that home segregation satisfied the requirements and 
hospitalization would only be enforced upon medical recommendation. 
While this reversal of policy appeased the rioting Indians, plague 
fatalities continued to appear throughout the rest of 1896. 
Although September saw large initial numbers of plague cases, 
neither October nor November of 1896 saw a total increase of cases.61 
Reports across India and the United Kingdom, such as the British 
Medical Journal, declared that “the plague in Bombay is abating.”62 This 
proved to be a faulty hope as the latter half of November and December 
saw a substantial rise in the number of cases. December especially saw a 
dramatic upsurge in plague mortality, from 130 deaths on December 1 to 
                                                 
57 Kidambi, “An Infection of Locality,” 252. 
58 Kumar, Medicine and the Raj, 197. 
59 Kidambi, “An Infection of Locality,” 263. 
60 Couchman, Account of Plague Administration, 11-2. 
61 Nathan, The Plague in India, vol. 1, 112. 
62 "Bubonic Plague," The British Medical Journal 2, no. 1871 (1896): 
1402. 
 




almost 300 deaths per day at the end of the month.63  This increase in 
cases, combined with the commissioner’s policies, led to a mass exodus 
of all those who had the means to leave the city. Thousands of people 
packed into railway stations to escape both the plague and the 
government actions to control it.64 Within the first months of plague, the 
city of Bombay saw large numbers of the population flee out into the 
countryside, almost 380,000 out of a population of 850,000 by February 
1897.65 Their flight ensured the spread of plague across India. The 
increase in cases progressively continued until a peak in February before 
rapidly declining throughout March and into the next few months. This 
pattern of rise and fall would remain typical for the plague in India over 
the next few years, with a peak in the later and early months of the year, 
and a decline from May to July.66 As later scientific committees would 
find, the ebb and flow of the plague epidemic largely depended on the 
number of fleas compared to the susceptibility of the host. In the summer 
and fall months, temperature remained a main factor in the lifespan of 
the flea, which explained the decline in plague cases during the warmer 
months compared to the increase during cooler months, when the activity 
and lifespan of the flea spiked.67 
As the sanitation methods proved useless and more people 
continued to flee the city, the government of India pressured Dr. 
Haffkine to provide a vaccine as quickly as possible. Haffkine hoped to 
develop a vaccine that ideally prevented infection and, hopefully, granted 
                                                 
63 W.F. Gatacre, Report on the Bubonic Plague in Bombay (Bombay: 
Times of India, 1897), 14. 
64 Bannerman, Plague in India, Past and Present, 1; Klein, “Plague, 
Policy, and Popular Unrest,” 735. 
65 Nathan, The Plague in India, vol. 1, 112-3; Arnold, Colonizing the 
Body, 207. 
66 Joseph A. Lewnard and Jeffrey P. Townsend, “Climatic and 
Evolutionary Drivers of Phase Shifts in the Plague Epidemics of Colonial 
India,” PNAS 113, no. 51 (December 2016): 14604-5. ; Klein, “Plague, Policy, 
and Popular Unrest,” 733. 
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immunity from the plague. The first round of prophylactic inoculations 
were ready in December of 1896, only a little over three months from the 
outbreak’s start in Bombay. 68 The vaccine was quite unpolished and 
resulted in severe reactions and complications. Haffkine went on to 
develop his vaccine until the effects were much milder. He tested the 
new and improved vaccine on himself to ascertain its effectiveness and 
reduced consequences. In late January, an outbreak of plague struck one 
of the Bombay jails. Haffkine offered to test his vaccine on any 
volunteering prisoners. He inoculated 134 in the prison, while 177 
refused the vaccine. Among those who refused inoculation, thirteen 
succumbed to the plague and seven died. Haffkine’s vaccine 
demonstrated its effectiveness as only one person became sick and 
recovered after receiving the vaccine (two others received the injection 
but died hours later from already being infected with plague).69 
Haffkine’s vaccine proved to offer a greater protection from death than 
those who refused inoculation.70 Within the next several months, 
Haffkine and his assistants inoculated individual volunteers in Bombay 
and the surrounding communities.  
British control over the epidemic and the superiority of western 
medicine were tested during 1897. An overwhelming desire to eradicate 
plague spiked as cities outside of Bombay reported cases appearing 
within their jurisdiction. By late-January, as Haffkine tested his 
vaccination, Karachi and Poona experienced plague epidemics.71 In 
Bombay, the grain warehouses became the center of increased suspicion 
as the source of the infection because the first plague cases appeared 
there.72 Though the public were right to connect the plague to the 
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warehouses, the grain inside did not contain the plague bacillus. Instead, 
the transported grain came into contact with rats and the rat-flea, X. 
cheopis, which “bred best in the debris of cereal gains.”73 The whole 
continent of India experienced a wide famine in the 1890s and the spread 
of relief grain, especially from ports such as Bombay, provided an 
avenue of dissemination for plague. Rats followed the grain and helped 
transport plague to the outlying villages. 
The grain trade likely single-handedly increased the number of 
plague cases within India. The flight of thousands aided in this 
dissemination as clothing and bedding transported plague-carrying fleas 
across India. Once in a location with their proper hosts, the fleas attacked 
and infected the local rat population, starting a plague epizootic among 
the rats.74 Both Karachi and Poona experienced a large number of rat 
deaths before human cases emerged. By this time, scientists and medical 
professionals highly suspected the rat played an important role in the 
spread of plague. The Austrian plague commission, one of the foreign 
groups sent to study Bombay’s plague in 1896, studied mosquitos as 
possible plague transmitters, but found no evidence of infection caused 
by them.75  
The inquiry into different methods of plague transmission 
demonstrated an important shift in the scientific community. Long held 
miasmatic and contagion beliefs were being challenged through 
experimentation. While these beliefs were not necessarily built on faulty 
observations, new tools allowed for deeper investigations into the 
specifics of the plague bacillus. Dr. Ernest Hankin, an English 
bacteriologist who studied cholera in India, conducted a series of 
experiments on ants and found that although they could contain the 
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plague bacillus, they could not be the perpetrator of the disease.76 Dr. M. 
Otaga, a Japanese scientist found in 1897 that fleas discovered on 
plague-stricken rats contained plague bacilli. The German plague 
commission in the same year discovered that fleas could spread plague to 
guinea pigs.77 Their experiments and findings implicated a new enemy in 
the battle against plague. Yet these discoveries faced serious criticism as 
common knowledge contended that rat-fleas did not bite humans. 
As the scientific community argued over whether fleas 
transmitted plague to humans, the British government faced a potential 
international crisis. European nations, especially France, requested a 
meeting of the International Sanitary Conference to discuss the 
implications of plague in India.78 Under this pressure and the threat of 
trade embargos, the British House of Commons met January 22, 1897, 
with Lord George Hamilton, the secretary of state for India, to discuss 
the measures being taken to stop the plague’s spread. Lord Hamilton 
informed the Commons that he suspected the epidemic would get worse 
as the winter continued. To combat the possibility that the thousands 
fleeing the city carried plague, the governments in Bombay, Karachi and 
Poona mandated that inspections and examinations were to be conducted 
at all train stations and sea ports by medical officers.79 
Hamilton’s news brought more worry than relief to the House of 
Commons. The news of so many fleeing concerned the British, 
especially as another port city, Karachi, experienced plague most likely 
transported from Bombay. Port cities acted as colonial jewels for the 
British Empire. They showcased British power, commerce, and 
colonialism to the rest of the world. The fear that Bombay’s plague 
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would spread to infect India’s other key ports, such as Calcutta, and the 
threat of an international embargo heavily influenced the passage of the 
Epidemic Diseases Act on February 4, 1897.80 
The short act, only four sections long, gave the government 
unprecedented powers to stop the plague. Essentially, the government 
could empower with formal authority any official or public 
announcement in its pursuit to halt the plague.81 This included 
segregation, hospitalization, and inspections across India. Six days later, 
the Governor General of India used the powers of the act to give greater 
control over building inspections and disinfections to the sanitation and 
municipal officers. These officers condemned buildings, evicted 
residents of overcrowded buildings, and used their powers to threaten 
landlords for cooperation.82 Medical officers examined people across the 
city and hospitalized those found with plague symptoms.83 House 
inspections removed any suspected of being infected to hospitals or 
segregation camps. In Poona, a city known for its opposition to colonial 
rule, British troops conducted a majority of the house searches while 
crudely manhandling those who got in their way. Kumar noted that 
“reports of sexual harassment, insult and abuse by British troops soon 
began to circulate in the city” and these seemed to the people as evidence 
of British punishment towards a rebellious city.84 In retaliation, Indians 
began to hide their infected or dead family members to avoid their 
removal by these house inspections.85 Fears that the plague officers 
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hospitalized people “to make a speedy end to them” spread rapidly.86 
Riots also broke out across India over the execution of colonial power, 
but the government suppressed these through continued military 
intervention.87  
As tensions increased and plague spread farther into western 
India, the International Sanitary Conference met in May in Venice, Italy 
to discuss the British response to the plague and the likelihood of it 
reaching European shores. Representatives from all over Europe 
deliberated over the findings of the many foreign plague commission 
reports. When the discussion came to what measures the conference felt 
were necessary, the British delegation declared that in response to the 
spreading plague, the Muslim pilgrimage from India to Mecca would be 
prohibited for the year.88 They also agreed to comply with sanitation 
measures on ships carrying cargo to Europe. France pushed to impose 
harsher restrictions against Indian ships to prevent the spread into 
Europe. However, the fear of harming international commerce swayed 
the Sanitation Conference to limit its actions against India.89 Instead, the 
agreed upon sanitation regulations became the only precautions 
recommended by the conference as they believed that “there seems to be 
but little danger of the pest reaching Europe this year.”90 Despite 
France’s hopes, British Indian ports remained opened and functioning 
with very little intervention.91 
As Britain triumphed on the international level, problems in 
India continued to intensify. The British efforts to prevent and contain 
the plague were largely feared and hated by Indians. Hospitalization 
posed a major problem, as the British realized caste and gender would 
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not simply be brushed away by western medicine. Rumors of caste 
mixing and uncleanliness increased Indian wariness, and many refused to 
go to the hospital when sick.92 Indians saw hospitals and doctors as 
agents of the plague, desiring to either kill or infect them by the Queen’s 
orders.93 While these concerns remained troublesome to British plague 
policy, the examination of women caused the most violence and anger 
among the people. Traditionally, Indian women were not touched by men 
outside of the household, yet male doctors primarily examined these 
women in public, an extreme dishonor and mistreatment in Indian 
culture.94 Riots, protests, and violence ensued based on suspected 
detainment or abuse of Indian women. This violence culminated in the 
assassination of Plague Committee chairman W.C. Rand and Lieutenant 
Ayerst in Poona late at night on June 22, 1897.95 As the people of India 
rejoiced in their declaration of noncooperation, Rand and Ayerst’s 
murders shocked the British government as many feared that continued 
measures would bring even worse results and wondered if this was the 
start of a rebellion.96  
By the end of 1897, plague had exploded outside of Bombay and 
spread to over fifteen cities scattered across the north and west, but 
remained nearly nonexistent in central and southern India. The plague 
also finally appeared in Jullandar, Punjab where it ravaged the 
population, supplying a majority of India’s 12 million plus plague 
deaths.97 Prevention measures to stop the spread failed as key northern 
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areas like the Punjab and North-West Provinces acknowledged plague 
outbreaks appearing within their lands. Increased dissatisfaction, 
violence and concealment by Indians worried British officials that 
segregation methods would be unreasonably hard to implement.98 In 
order to keep appearances of control for the international community, 
and to exert colonial force, the Government of India announced stricter 
and more comprehensive adherence to anti-plague measures.99 
Admittance to segregation camps grew as medical officers sent family 
and friends of plague victims to the camps while their houses underwent 
the disinfection process.100 As British troops were called in to help local 
medical officers, Indian resistance grew more creative. They hid infected 
family members within chests, under clothing, and wherever they might 
not be found; they also memorized the inspection troops’ routes to avoid 
being caught unaware.101 Indians rarely called on physicians for fear of 
possible poisoning or hospitalization. As British precaution measures 
continued to fail due to an assortment of reasons, specifically concerning 
lack of information on how the disease spread, Indian compliance with 
western medicine declined and resistance increased.  
In 1898, the French scientist Paul-Louis Simond connected what 
Dr. Otaga discovered in 1897, that fleas could contain the plague 
bacillus, to the plague epidemic occurring in India. In his experiment, 
Simond found that rat-fleas transmitted plague among rats and, when 
hungry, to humans.102 Skepticism surrounded Simond’s findings as the 
medical community largely ignored and dismissed his publication. If 
accepted, his work would have negated much of the anti-plague 
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measures advocated by the medical community and enforced by the 
British army. It would be another eight years before Simond’s work 
gained acceptance and influenced proactive measures in India. 
Meanwhile, enormous death tolls caused some coastal villages to 
lose over a fourth of their population within two to three months.103 The 
high death rates simply amplified the volatile situation between 
governmental measures and Indian resistance. Numerous Indians 
believed that physicians spread the disease to ensure their wages or that 
the gods used medical officials as a part of their divine punishment. 
Instead, they trusted local practitioners and enchantments over 
government mandates and medical officers.104 This aversion continued to 
impact British-Indian relationships, as many Britons did not understand 
Indian resistance to western medical practice. Their refusals of 
cooperation and use of violence frustrated British efforts in the country. 
 Violence continued to escalate in Bombay and other regions of 
India. In March 1898, riots erupted in Bombay over the segregation of a 
young girl. Muslim weavers harmed a magistrate in their effort to burn 
down the hospitals and surrounding buildings to prevent the girl’s 
isolation. The suggestion of anti-plague vaccinations in Calcutta resulted 
in riots against suspected inoculators and the flight of 150,000 people 
from the city.105 Cawnpore, a city in northern India, saw severe riots in 
1900 over segregation camp detainments and a misinterpretation over 
regulation requirements.106 In 1901, major riots in the Sialkot and 
Gurdaspur districts of the Punjab saw over 300 Sikhs, a prominent 
religious group in the area, destroy plague camps and kill three 
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individuals.107 Other forms of resistance continued as Indians voiced 
their hatred of British anti-plague methods. Rumors that the plague 
signaled the downfall of British rule in India spread as more Indians 
defied colonial mandates.108  
 In response to the violence and rumors, British government 
officials in India decided that political concerns needed to take 
precedence over medical recommendations.109 Sanitation methods had 
done little to curb the epidemic and compulsory measures resulted in 
violence akin to the Indian Mutiny of 1857. The resulting tensions in 
light of few European plague casualties convinced British administrators 
that the risk of continued anti-plague measures would result in more 
trouble than good.110 In their minds, if the Indians wanted to discard 
western medicine and British help to face plague on their own, then they 
would have to suffer the consequences of their decision. 
By 1900, modification to the anti-plague measures resulted in the 
elimination of those policies Myron Echenberg, author of Plague Ports, 
deemed as “unduly repressive.”111 The Indian Plague Commission 
reported that compulsory measures, including house inspections and 
segregation, were counter-productive and requested their end. The 
British government in India agreed and announced that compulsory 
hospitalization and segregation were no longer encouraged without the 
approval of the local community leaders. The sanitary commissioner 
made large efforts to “enlist the help of the respectable and intelligent 
members of the native community” to change public opinion. 112 Public 
hospitals adhering to caste restrictions opened to ease Indian resistance to 
hospitalization. The total number of hospitals jumped from 1200 in 1880 
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to 2500 in 1902 to service the specific needs of the people.113 In order to 
appease the Indian traditions concerning women and the violence 
surrounding their inspections, the British allowed for Muslim and Hindu 
women observing strict traditional views to be administered to by female 
physicians only.114 
As compulsory measures were abandoned, physicians and plague 
officials promoted inoculation to hinder the plague’s further spread. Dr. 
Haffkine’s vaccine produced useful results in his earlier tests and its use 
in Bombay. Medical officials looked to use his vaccines across the 
Punjab and northern India in a widescale, voluntary inoculation 
campaign.  Beforehand, Haffkine had been revered as the “Savior of 
India,” but as colonial health officials began to recommend the use of his 
vaccine, the public opposed its introduction.115 The change in 
manufactured doses from 1896-1901 to 1902 showcased the sudden 
switch from acceptance to rejection. By May 1901 over 2.3 million 
vaccines were created and circulated in India within the four and a half 
year period. However, in 1902, the number decreased to less than 
500,000 doses.116 
Hoping to still gather ample volunteers, despite wide rejections, 
the Government of India opted to distribute the relatively cheap and easy 
inoculation across the rest of India, but concentrating particularly in the 
Punjab. In a massive medical and administrative undertaking, almost 
500,000 people in the Punjab received Haffkine’s vaccine in 1902-3.117 
Medical officials expected a much greater acceptance of the vaccine than 
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they received. Plague statistics had continued to rise throughout India, 
with Bombay suffering as many as four hundred deaths per day in 
1901.118 Regardless, the increase in cases did not prompt acceptance of 
British medical advice. Several villages asked to inoculate reacted so 
negatively that they were bypassed entirely.119 This partly came from the 
popular belief that physicians introduced plague through the 
inoculations.120 The intense distrust for government physicians cannot be 
disregarded, as it shaped Indian response to many colonial regulations 
and recommendations.  
Vaccination also prompted an extensive chain of rumors and 
fears that made many adamantly opposed to it. These rumors hurt the 
chances of inoculation as locals believed that, as Edmund Wilkinson, an 
officer reporting on the progress of inoculations in the Punjab, described, 
“needles a yard long which were pushed in at one side of the body and 
emerged at the other.”121 Rumors of death, bad eyesight, “unusual 
sensations of the heart” and “destroying sexual powers” kept the general 
public from accepting the proposed vaccinations. In November 1902, 
public perceptions of inoculation further decreased after the Malkowal 
village incident.122 An English doctor inoculated a group of Malkowal 
villagers in November 1902 with contaminated serum and nineteen fell 
seriously ill and died.123 The incident removed what slight trust 
physicians had amongst the people and doused the medical official’s 
enthusiasm for their task as well.124  
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Haffkine’s vaccination provided better survival rates than any 
proactive measure the British introduced. Selman A. Waksman, author of 
The Brilliant and Tragic Life of W.M.W. Haffkine, wrote that the 
inoculations reduced the mortality rate by 85-90 per cent.125 Although 
the vaccines worked to save many lives, they were consistently unable to 
fully grant protection from plague, instead offering a better chance at 
protecting oneself from death if plague was contracted. The only 
foolproof method found by the Indians involved completely evacuating a 
place once the rats began to die.126 As John Spencer Carmen, a 
missionary physician living in Hyderabad in central India during the 
plague, wrote: 
 
Most of the people in India still don’t know about the 
relation of these things (some of them so little, 
microscopic) to the mysterious disease that comes so 
quickly and kills so ruthlessly. What did the people in 
London do? The best they knew; but mostly they fled, if 
they could, and often carried the infection with them. So 
it is with many in India. And when death comes close, in 
their own house, they run quickly and offer a sacrifice to 
their gods that the plague may be stayed; or else 
fatalistically accept it as the inexorable will of God.127 
  
The rats’ connection to the plague marked them as “the Devil’s 
agents” among the people of India.128 Escaping the presence of the rat 
proved impossible, as they infested houses, granaries, and burrows 
throughout the city. Rats followed the source of food and travelled across 
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the city in search of it. As they travelled, fleas followed their food source 
and spread to different areas of a city or village. People soon practiced 
the art of fleeing whenever villages or towns reported plague infections. 
In the Himalayan villages of India, W.B. Bannerman of the Indian 
Medical Service described that the people voluntarily left their villages to 
seek shelter in the nearby jungle. They built a temporary village of huts 
and stayed away for several months before returning to their village free 
of plague. Bannerman noted that this method of evacuation became the 
preferred recommendation of plague authorities as prevention measures 
proved unhelpful.129 This method gained acceptance in the Punjab, as 
several hundreds of villages suffered major outbreaks. Later the 1906 
Plague Commission found that the unparalleled suffering of the Punjab 
in part stemmed from the fact that the rat common to the Punjab “harbors 
considerably more fleas than it does in Bombay.”130 
As Simond’s work gained greater respect due to the research 
conducted by the 1906 Plague Commission confirming the role of rats 
and fleas in plague transmission, the people found another avenue to deal 
with the rise in infections. Rat killing became a favored approach in 
areas resistant to inoculation, with the government even offering prizes 
in return for rat-tails.131 Religious groups like Hindus, who worshipped 
rats, and Jains, who practiced strict non-violence, remained vehemently 
against these measures.132 While public perception held that killing the 
rats would stop the spread of plague, in reality, it most likely heightened 
the numbers of immediate cases as fleas then had no natural host and 
jumped to humans more readily.  
The turn to rat-killing and endorsed fleeing marked the 
withdrawal of strenuous British efforts in halting the plague in India. By 
the withdrawal, plague had become in the minds of the British simply 
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another Indian disease. Spreading rapidly from China and India in 1896, 
plague appeared in Japan, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, the United 
States, and England by 1900.133 Barbara Bramanti, Katharine Dean, Lars 
Walloe, and Nils Stenseth, in their article “The Third Plague Pandemic in 
Europe,” calculated the number of European plague cases and deaths 
through public records and newspapers. They found that from 1899 to 
1947, Europe experienced “1,692 cases and 457 deaths from plague”.134 
Comparatively, Charles Creighton, a plague physician working in India, 
recorded that in 1906 alone India saw over a million deaths, with almost 
half occurring in the Punjab region.135 The few British deaths and the 
strength of Indian resistance resulted in British turnover of anti-plague 
measures to local officials and native practitioners who never embarked 
on prevention campaigns as fierce as the British. 
According to the World Health Organization, The Third Plague 
Pandemic ranged from the first cases in China in 1855 to 1959, when the 
number of cases dropped below 200 worldwide.136 Within those years, 
twelve to twenty-five million deaths are estimated to have occurred, with 
a mass majority of these from India. Common scholarship unanimously 
agreed that India suffered over 75 percent of recorded fatalities. Due to 
the nature of British anti-plague measures, these numbers are most likely 
quite higher, as many Indians sought to hide their plague stricken family 
members and friends from British plague officers. By the end of the 
Third Plague Pandemic, the world equated India with plague. 
The Third Plague Pandemic challenged the relationship between 
the colonial powers of Great Britain and the common people of India. 
                                                 
133 Barbara Bramanti, Katharine Dean, Lars Walloe, and Nils Chr. 
Stenseth, “The Third Plague Pandemic in Europe,” Proceedings of the Royal 
Society: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1901 (April 24, 2019): 1. 
134 Bramanti, “The Third Plague Pandemic,” 2. 
135 Creighton, Plague in India, 312. 
136 John Frith, “The History of Plague –Part 1. The Three Great 
Pandemics,” Journal of Military and Veterans’ Health 20, no. 2 (April 2012): 
15. 
 




Resistance throughout the nation spoke to the people’s disdain for British 
interference and the unprecedented anti-plague measures. Concealment 
and riots became commonplace as Indians voiced their hatred to not only 
what they saw as an overstep of British power, but the forceful 
integration of western medicine. Scientific understanding advanced 
rapidly during the plague years to bridge the disconnect between theory 
and experience. However, these advancements came too late to save 
British-Indian relationships as the damage from preventive plague 
measures already took its toll. The Third Plague Pandemic reminded the 
world of the fright of bubonic plague, but more importantly, it forever 
changed the lives of so many in India as they saw what their resistance 
could accomplish.  
